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Introduction: The Substance of the Shadow 
 
The purpose here is to examine human intelligence (humint) and counterintelligence 
during the American Civil War with an eye to determining effects on military operations 
and to identifying fundamental shortcomings. The Civil War marked a watershed both 
in American history and in the annals of warfare. It established the predominance of the 
Federal government, subordinating states’ rights to national authority in various 
spheres, and finally eliminating assertions of “state sovereignty.” Before the Civil War, 
the United States, primarily an agrarian society, was still a plural noun in common 
usage (the United States are). Thereafter, it would develop steadily into an industrial 
power, and would become a singular noun (the United States is). 
 
Likewise, the Civil War represented a turning point in some aspects of warfare.  
Mounted cavalry was still an important military instrument, and frontal assaults not 
infrequent, but repeating rifles had become prevalent, and even machine-guns were 
making an appearance. Rifle-pits, earthworks, and fire-trenches foreshadowed the 
ghastly stalemate of World War I. At sea, submarines and mines, then known as 
torpedoes, claimed many victims, further portending twentieth-century maritime 
conflict. The Monitor and the Merrimack, renamed the Virginia by the Confederacy, 
fought the first sea-battle between ironclads. 
 
With respect to intelligence and clandestine operations, the U.S. Civil War was a 
transitionary point of time and would begin ushering in substantial changes. Among 
other things, it brought intimations of the modern national security state. Habeas 
corpus was suspended in the name of public safety in wartime, and civil liberties were 
curtailed. The notion of “all-source” intelligence was developed by the Secret Service 
headed in the early days of the war by Allan Pinkerton, whose name remains familiar 
today because of the detective agency he founded. Intelligence, counterintelligence, and 
even “disinformation” networks evolved in both the Union and the Confederacy. 
Pinkerton made his reputation at the beginning of the war by uncovering a plot to 
assassinate President Abraham Lincoln, an early example of effective 
counterintelligence. At the war’s end, his successor in the Secret Service, Lafayette 
Baker, ignored information about the plans of Southern sympathizers to murder the 
President until it was too late, a notable counterintelligence failure. Baker was never 
able to account satisfactorily for the agent who was absent the night the President was 
shot. Nor was the Secret Service at a higher stage of readiness at the time. 
 
Live and Let Die 
 
By modern standards, of course, the scope of intelligence in the Civil War was limited, 
the process ad hoc. Yet, intelligence activities would progress into more modern 
conceptions of operational and strategic intelligence, directed toward “who has what, 
where, and what they plan to do with it”; technological intelligence, focusing on enemy 
weapon systems and developments; and counterintelligence, involving protection of 
crucial information and assets. Today, one associates technological intelligence with 
missiles and other sophisticated weapon systems, yet one might add parenthetically that 
technological intelligence was previously the specialty of naval intelligence. It is not 
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coincidental that James Bond is a British naval officer, or that the “black chambers” of 
the great powers of the early twentieth century were organized and staffed by naval 
personnel. The concept of technological secrecy came into its own with the British 
construction of the Dreadnought, the first modern battleship. So secretive was the 
project and so effective the security surrounding it that little was known of the 
Dreadnought before it was actually launched.1 Prior to this time, details of warship 
construction were widely publicized.  
 
With numerous military innovations, such as ironclads, torpedoes, submarines and 
minefields, the Civil War offered ample opportunity for espionage, even though neither 
side made much effort to conceal technological advancements. Few troubled themselves 
much to hide the development of nineteenth-century Wunderwaffen. Both sides knew 
about each other’s development of ironclad vessels, for example, although the South 
failed to anticipate the rapid deployment of the Union’s Monitor. In land warfare, major 
technological innovations were widely comprehended, and essential elements of 
operational intelligence concentrated largely on determination of troop movements and 
dispositions. 
 
Without doubt, the prevailing lack of effectiveness has invited dramatization of Civil 
War intelligence over the years. Female spies inveigled information from government 
officials and military officers, and carried secret messages on their persons. Their 
exploits, clever as these sometimes were, seldom contributed significantly to the 
outcome of battle, though. Military histories mention such deeds tangentially, but 
observers do not usually afford these much serious consideration. And although spies 
tended to emerge and be recruited from the fringes of society, intelligence operatives 
were to be found in all walks of life.2 Elizabeth Van Lew, an aristocratic Southern belle, 
became a spy for the North. Rose O’Neal Greenhow, a leading Washington society 
personage, spied for the South. Not generally known, yet all the more remarkable, is that 
Harriet Tubman, of Underground Railroad fame, also served as a Union intelligence 
operative, utilizing the contacts and safehouses she developed before the outbreak of 
hostilities in the Union war effort.3 The continued operation of the Underground 
Railroad reminds us that the Civil War was, in substance, an ideological conflict. Slavery 
was at the root of the “states rights” issue, and the extension of slavery into the 
territories was a direct cause of war. Little room for compromise and moderation existed 
when passions ran as high as they did by the late 1850s. A consequence of the intense 
emotions the slavery question aroused was that a pool of recruits for clandestine service 
was readily available, and many on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line simply 
appointed themselves  intelligence operatives.  
 
You Only Live Twice 
 
More often than not, intelligence and counterintelligence personnel were selected and 
assumed their duties largely by happenstance. Pinkerton, America’s first spymaster, was 
                                                          
1 Breyer, Siegfried,  Battleships and Battle Cruisers, 1905-1970, trans. Alfred Kurti (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday & Company, 1973), 46-49.  
2 Ind, Allison, A Short History of Espionage (New York: David McKay, 1963), 99. 
3 Smedley, R.C., History of the Underground Railroad (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 250. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 5
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss5/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.3S.1475
55 
 
a case in point. Pinkerton made a name for himself as an astute railway detective before 
the war, and it was in the course of protecting the railroads against sabotage by pro-
secession zealots that he stumbled upon the plot to assassinate the President when the 
latter was traveling to Washington for his inauguration. He contacted Lincoln’s staff, 
and together they arranged for the President to enter the city secretly on the night of 
February 22, 1861.4 Impressed by this initial performance, Lincoln asked Pinkerton to 
head the Union’s Secret Service, founded in 1860 by the Treasury Department. As the 
war ground on, Pinkerton’s organization became a nascent intelligence-collection, 
counterespionage, and anti-terrorist outfit. Baker, Pinkerton’s successor as head of the 
Secret Service, was an ardent abolitionist who waged clandestine war against the 
Confederacy with a vengeance. 
 
It is noteworthy, and perhaps a little ironic, that Southern intelligence operatives were 
less often drawn to service by ideological fervor. The more idealistic of them, as was true 
of some Confederate military leaders such as Robert E. Lee or Thomas J. “Stonewall” 
Jackson, were not enamored of the Southern “cause” so much as they displayed a keen 
loyalty to their native state and people. For example, one of the most colorful of all the 
Civil War's spies, Belle Boyd, was seventeen years old when a group of Union soldiers 
occupied her family's farm and attempted to raise the Union flag over it. When an officer 
insulted her mother, Belle shot the man dead. After a military tribunal released her, she 
acted largely on impulse to collect intelligence on Union forces, often by using her 
charms to extract information from unwary Federal officers. On more than one 
occasion, she warned Confederate units of impending attacks. “Stonewall” Jackson once 
expressed his debt of gratitude to her.5 
 
Eventually, Belle Boyd was arrested for espionage, then exchanged. She traveled to 
England, and was alleged to have married a Union naval officer. By one account, she was 
captured on a blockade-runner and applied her feminine wiles to the prize officer, who 
was later court-martialed and cashiered from the service. Some say she enticed him to 
spy for the Confederacy thereafter. By another account, the officer was indeed 
enraptured, but married her only after the war.6 However it may be, she went on to 
make her name and fortune after the war by publicizing her espionage adventures. 
During her modest stage career, she billed herself  “Cleopatra of the Succession” and the 
“Siren of the Shenandoah.” This sequel to her intelligence collection activities during the 
war brings to the fore a problem inherent in all accounts of nineteenth-century 
espionage and counter-espionage, that of authenticity. Espionage is an intrinsically 
difficult area in which to ascertain facts. Before the growth of intelligence bureaucracies, 
personal memoirs of spies and their contacts were often the chief source of information, 
and such accounts lend themselves to being spiced and adorned, with no one able to 
gainsay. Even in the twentieth century, with intelligence operations far more centralized 
and formally organized, official accounts are often kept secret for many years, and are 
themselves subject to tampering for a variety of reasons, usually self-serving ones. 
 
                                                          
4 The Civil War Almanac  (New York: Facts on File, 1982), 365-66. 
5  Seth, Ronald, Some of My Favorite Spies  (New York: Chilton Book Company, 1968), 40-41.   
6  Ind, A Short History of Espionage, 107-109. 
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The dearth of reliable material and sources in part explains the extensive discussion of 
women in Civil War intelligence collection, and the human interest appeal of their 
exploits abets romanticizing. Women did, in fact, often assume a prominent role in 
intelligence collection, sometimes simply by default, since intelligence organizations 
were in an embryonic stage and centralized intelligence was nascent. Civilian 
populations were frequently in close proximity to and had considerable contact with 
military forces, a circumstance conducive to conveying crucial information and timely 
news. People with intense feelings one way or another had opportunities to undertake 
actions on their own. Many, if not most, intelligence couriers were women, above all, 
because they could usually pass through the lines without much difficulty. Throughout 
the war, women were accustomed to moving about relatively freely, even in enemy-
occupied territory. Who was to refute that they were merely out and about visiting their 
“men folk”? 
 
The restrictive lives women tended to lead in the past would not seem to have equipped 
them either with the requisite self-confidence or the professional skills for conducting 
intelligence operations. Herein lies a paradox, though.7 Archaic nineteenth-century 
notions of chivalry, especially in the South, rendered women above suspicion and often 
protected them from severe punishment, hence heightening their value as spies 
immensely. Rose Greenhow and Belle Boyd survived arrest. Men in a like situation were 
often summarily executed. The nurse-spy Emma Edmonds, an abolitionist Southerner 
determined to serve the anti-slavery cause, fit the pattern neatly as well.8 While working 
as nurse, she volunteered to replace a male Union spy in Richmond who had been 
hanged. She made numerous trips across the lines, at times disguised as a black man. 
Her cover was nearly blown when she was set to hard labor. Thereafter, she would 
usually disguise herself as a black woman, and occasionally as an Irish camp-follower. 
Edmonds came and went as she chose, arousing few suspicions, even when crossing the 
lines. To boot, she demonstrated no lack of cunning in her endeavors.  
 
Close civilian-military contacts coupled with almost astonishing laxity in security 
sometimes resulted in remarkable espionage sagas. “Rebel Rose” Greenhow, society lady 
and social climber of humble origins, who had married into a prominent Richmond 
family and later entertained Washington’s elite, is legendary. After becoming a widow, 
she also became a sort of high-class courtesan. Among her frequent visitors was 
bachelor President James Buchanan. Her political connections, strong Southern 
sympathies, and outright contempt for Lincoln and the Republicans, compelled her to 
serve as a Confederate spy. “The Rebel Rose” was instrumental in establishing a 
Confederate spy ring in Washington prior to the outbreak of war. In conjunction with 
Thomas Jordan, a military officer of Confederate persuasion stationed in Washington in 
1861, she proceeded to recruit Confederate operatives in the Federal bureaucracy, 
including in the War Department.9 
 
In the early phases of the war, the “Rebel Rose” continued to receive gentlemen callers 
including senior officers, congressmen, and even members of Lincoln’s Cabinet. From 
                                                          
7  Newman, Bernard, Epics of Espionage (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), 64. 
8  Singer, Kurt, Three Thousand Years of Espionage (New York: Prentice Hall, 1948), 122-30. 
9  Ind, A Short History of Espionage, 80-87. 
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such high-level contacts, she gleaned information that was initially of considerable value 
to operations. Her courier, for example, kept Confederate generals posted on Union 
troop movements on the eve of the First Battle of Manassas. She even acquired a 
genuine copy of Union General Irwin McDowell’s order-of-battle. Partly through her 
efforts, the Battle of Manassas turned into a critical Confederate victory, and it certainly 
represented a sobering experience for her Washington social acquaintances, many of 
whom turned out in holiday spirit fully expecting to see the rebels run. Since the 
engagement was such a near-run affair, and Union victory at Manassas might well have 
precipitated a moral collapse of the Confederacy, one should not make light of  “Rebel 
Rose”  intelligence.    
 
Notwithstanding widespread suspicions about her, the “Rebel Rose” continued to 
operate fairly openly even late into 1862, and counterintelligence efforts were feeble and 
largely ineffectual. When Pinkerton’s men began to close the net around her, she 
circulated petitions denouncing such “persecution,” and availed herself of high-level 
political connections. She could not simply be apprehended and put on trial, because 
arrest was a politically delicate issue in this instance. The “Rebel Rose” had befriended 
too many important people. When the Secret Service endeavored to use her house as a 
“mousetrap,” that is, as a counterintelligence instrument, by keeping track of comings 
and goings, Greenhow developed her own countermeasures.10 She also used coded 
correspondence, apparently even after her eventual internment. Pinkerton made 
arrangements to read her mail, some of which consisted of vapid and seemingly 
innocuous high-society chit-chat addressed to one “Aunt Sally.”11 Some of the 
correspondences were certainly encoded, but Pinkerton and his agents made no effort to 
discover the identity of “Aunt Sally,” or to determine whether she existed at all.   
 
Greenhow understood the need for timely intelligence, utilizing at least three female 
couriers, Betty Duval, Lillie MacKall and Antonia Ford, to carry messages through the 
lines. It was Duvall who carried a packet of information to the Confederate forces on the 
eve of the First Battle of Manassas. Later, as the war dragged on with no end in sight to 
the appalling slaughter, feelings hardened, the Federal government became less 
fastidious about respect for civil liberties, and Greenhow was imprisoned. Nonetheless, 
security in Washington remained slack, and lips were often loose. Counterintelligence 
operations still had a long way to go, and in the case of “The Rebel Rose,” apparently no 
one thought of planting disinformation on her. Had this been done, she could have 
become a valuable Union asset. Perhaps nothing, though, could better demonstrate 
counterintelligence amateurism than Greenhow’s arrest at her residence. A basic maxim 
of counterintelligence tells one to avoid under all circumstances apprehending a 
suspected spy at home. As it turned out, “The Rebel Rose” used one of her female 
couriers to smuggle out the most compromising evidence, right under Pinkerton’s nose. 
By no means, though, did Washington have a monopoly on lax security. Critical 
information often flowed out of Richmond and other Southern cities as sand through a 
sieve. If Union counterintelligence operations were at best rudimentary, Confederate 
ones were, if anything, worse. The cardinal reason is to be found largely in the 
decentralized nature of the Confederate polity. The Confederacy’s constituent parts were 
                                                          
10  Newman, Epics of Espionage, 40. 
11  Ind, A Short History of Espionage, 87. 
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jealously protective of their sovereignty; “states rights” remained the rallying cry; and to 
the bitter end Confederate leaders were unable or unwilling to impose the sort of 
societal discipline necessary to conduct a protracted conflict for the highest stakes. 
Effective wartime counterintelligence, with its attendant restrictive measures, requisite 
investigations and curtailment of civil liberties, might not have been possible in the 
Confederacy.  
 
The Confederacy’s designated spycatcher was General John Henry Winder, who headed 
the “Safety Committee,” which passed for a counterintelligence organization, but was 
notoriously inefficient and corrupt. One of Winder’s chief detectives, Philip Cashmeyer, 
was a double agent and in the employ of Elizabeth Van Lew. Union operatives regularly 
reported how Winder and his subordinates could be bribed to issue travel passes. Few 
questions were asked when the money was right.12 Five Pinkerton agents made a total of 
fourteen trips to Richmond from October 1861 to April 1862, serving as couriers and 
entering the city fairly easily.13 In the spring of 1862, with huge Federal armies poised to 
strike the Confederate capital from the east, more astute intelligence operatives might 
have ascertained how weak the Confederate defenses were. To be sure, a more 
enterprising Union general than George McClellan would have insisted on better 
intelligence, accepted the risks, reconciled himself to the casualties, and pushed 
forward.  
  
Of  Vexation and Vanity 
 
Elizabeth Van Lew of Richmond took it upon herself to spy for the North, and on her 
own initiative established an intelligence network in Virginia. Van Lew turned against 
slavery at a fairly early age, so great an impropriety in a proper Southern lady that she 
was widely referred to as “Crazy Bet,” and became a pariah.  The openness of her 
sympathies, but above all, the common perception she was not quite sane, to which she 
contributed by a disheveled and untidy appearance, served as suitable cover for her 
activities. Despite all the evidence, few harbored genuine suspicions about “Crazy Bet,”  
and a counterintelligence operation was never seriously considered.14 
 
Her espionage network in the very heart of the Confederacy would spread its tentacles 
wide, and, moreover, Van Lew would assist with escapes of Union prisoners-of-war, in 
one instance, arranging a breakout of over one-hundred men. On these activities she 
spent much of her fortune, and what should have been suspicious eccentricities became 
merely a matter of public record. An article in a Richmond newspaper spoke of “two 
ladies, mother and daughter, living on Church Hill…who attracted public notice by their 
assiduous attention to Yankee prisoners.”15 Such behavior in the North after 1863 would 
in all likelihood have landed the perpetrators in jail. One cannot be certain that her 
espionage had much operational effect, though in terms of sheer amounts of 
information delivered expeditiously she was one of the most proficient female spies in 
                                                          
12  Markle, Donald E., Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1994), 4.  
13  Fishel, Edwin C., The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil 
War    (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 564. 
14  Newman, Epics of Espionage, 42. 
15  Markle, Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War, 181.  
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history. From a humanitarian standpoint, the significance of the prisoner escapes she 
helped organize speaks for itself. As with  Greenhow, it is remarkable that a fairly well-
known woman, with plain-spoken enemy sympathies, was able to collect intelligence in 
the capital city with little hindrance. Like the “Rebel Rose,” she understood intuitively 
the importance of timely intelligence. Establishing a series of courier safehouses 
reaching to the Union lines, she collected intelligence in the Confederate capital, then 
dispatched it quickly to the Federal commanders. So efficient did the operation become, 
that toward the war’s end, fresh flowers arrived at General Grant’s headquarters almost 
daily with encrypted messages inside, care of the Van Lew network. After the war, a 
grateful Federal government rewarded Van Lew by appointing her Postmistress of 
Richmond. Some precautious officials in all likelihood thought she would be able to 
keep track of potential vengeful adherents to the “lost cause” in such a public office. Her 
customers for the most part distained her as a turncoat, though, and she was finally 
demoted to a minor clerkship.  When she died in 1900, the only mourners at her funeral 
were former servants and the relatives of Union soldiers she helped to escape from 
Southern prisons. Several were kinfolk of Colonel Paul Revere, the grandson of the 
Revolutionary War hero, whom she had concealed in her home after he had bolted 
captivity.16 They arranged to have a gravestone with the following inscription placed at 
the burial site: She risked everything that is dear to man—friends, fortune, comfort, 
health, life itself, all for the one absorbing desire of her heart—that slavery might be 
abolished and the Union preserved. 
 
Lafayette Baker made his military intelligence debut by gaining an interview with 
General Winfield Scott and volunteering to collect information on Confederate 
positions, weapons and troop movements. He determined that his cover should be an 
itinerant photographer, in the manner of the well-known, professional photographer 
Matthew Brady, and in fact, photographic espionage originated in the Civil War.17 On 
the Confederate side, A.D. Lytle would photograph Federal units in the Louisiana area, 
providing some useful information to Southern commanders. Pinkerton would employ 
Alexander Gardner as a photographic covert operator, and General William T. Sherman 
used photography to develop maps and assess terrain in his Georgia and South Carolina 
campaigns. 
 
One can scarcely think of an activity less subtle than an intelligence agent going about 
his business with a bulky camera in tow. Photography was still a novelty at the time of 
the Civil War, however, and officers and troops were only too happy to pose for 
portraits.18 Simple vanity in some cases presented itself, and Confederate cavalry 
General J.E.B. Stuart and other high-ranking officers once posed for Baker. Celebrated 
as the “last cavalier,” Stuart was courtly and high-headed, but not one of the hard-eyed 
men the war would later produce. His sense of the need for operational security left 
something to be desired, and the cavalier displayed little grasp of counterintelligence 
fundamentals. The dust on antique time would lie unswept. 
 
                                                          
16  Newman, Epics of Espionage, 184. 
17  Markle, Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War, xviii. 
18  Singer, Three Thousand Years of Espionage, 104-10. 
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It even borders on the farcical that Baker’s camera was not functional, but merely a 
means to acquire access to the Confederate Army. Granted, he could exploit the vanity 
of Confederate officers well enough, but it seems not to have dawned on him that with a 
functioning camera he could have taken photographs which themselves would have 
been of intelligence value, as others had already been doing. Instead, he found himself 
forced to move on when his customers requested non-existent portraits. 
 
The game was finally up for him, though, when he fell under suspicion and was arrested. 
What followed was one of the more bizarre episodes of the entire war, when Baker was 
taken to Richmond and personally interrogated by Confederate President Jefferson 
Davis. Perhaps nothing can better demonstrate the crying want of counterintelligence or 
the absence of adequate staff work generally than the specter of the Confederate 
President personally interviewing a suspected enemy spy. Black chambers and hard-
bitten counterintelligence agents still lay in the future, in more worldly-wise societies. 
Baker thoughtfully invented a cover story, posing as one Samuel Munston, of Knoxville, 
Tennessee, who supposedly had spent some years in California. A prominent citizen of 
Tennessee was produced to check this alibi, and Baker was able to learn by glancing at 
the man’s visiting card placed in the President’s appointment schedule that his name 
was Brock. When Brock entered the presidential office, Baker preempted by greeting 
Brock with his name. He then managed by sheer bluster to convince Brock they were old 
acquaintances. Baker secured his release, and returned to Washington to focus on 
counterintelligence work.  
 
His exploits eventually resulted in his selection as Pinkerton’s replacement. Pinkerton 
had proved to be an erratic and largely ineffective spymaster, above all, because he 
endeavored to handle intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and secret service 
work concurrently. In a word, Pinkerton and his cohorts were overextended, their 
efforts unfocused. Pinkerton bore chief responsibility for the safety of the President, 
among other duties, even when he was serving in the field as General McClellan’s chief 
provider of tactical intelligence, a task in which he hardly excelled anyway. Moreover, 
few of Pinkerton’s men had any prior military experience, and military intelligence 
operations differ significantly from detective work. The latter usually necessitates 
maintaining underworld contacts and tracking criminal groups, but such an approach is 
of limited value for wartime intelligence. For starters, espionage agents are drawn from 
a broader spectrum of society than the underworld, and their motives differ from those 
of common criminals. Many are moved by patriotism, rather than personal gain, for 
instance. Furthermore, accurate insight into an enemy’s plans is vital to assure war’s 
efficient conduct. Frederick the Great is credited with having said: “Great advantage is 
drawn from knowledge of your adversary, and when you know the measure of his 
intelligence and character you can use it to play on his weaknesses.”19 Intelligence is a 
tool for preserving a regime; in the case of the American Civil War, the Union. Grasping 
the import of certain information, in the trade jargon, separating the “wheat” from the 
“chaff,” presupposes considerable sophistication and expertise. Rigidity and 
frivolousness are traits that do not spell good fortune in intelligence. Pinkerton’s men 
were negotiating a steep learning curve. 
                                                          
19  Freeman Jr., Chas W., The Diplomat’s Dictionary (Washington, DC: National Defense University 
Press, 1994), 180. 
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Baker’s dogged resolution as head of the Secret Service was punctuated by occasional 
bursts of ingenuity. One of his agents, Timothy Webster, was established in his cover by 
feigning arrest as a Confederate spy, then escaping from pretended imprisonment. With 
his credibility thus secured, he was soon able to move in the highest Confederate circles. 
Unfortunately for this lucid scheme, Webster fell ill, then became incapacitated. A failed 
rescue attempt led to his exposure and proved his undoing. He was arrested and 
hanged. Northern popular reaction to what was widely perceived as a cruel outrage 
roused anti-Southern sentiment at a time of Union reversals on the battlefield and of 
subsequent flagging public morale. Hence, Webster did more for the Union cause in 
death as a martyr for freedom than he had done in life as a spy.20 Malicious tongues 
even spread the rumor that Union intelligence operatives had “thrown him to the 
wolves” for this very purpose. 
 
In another strange twist of fate, a near-hanging made the career of the condemned, one 
Reverend T.J. Mann.21 A Southerner, Mann was more saboteur than spy. During an 
attempt to employ an incendiary device to blow up a Union powder magazine, Mann 
was arrested when the powder failed to explode. Mann is said to have quipped that a 
lighted cigar would have worked better. When a group of Union soldiers started to lynch 
him, an officer appeared and ordered them to cut him down. Mann survived the war, 
and afterwards frequented the lecture circuit, giving his account of being hanged. As 
might be expected, his renditions were dramatic and emotion-laden. He described the 
sensations of wonderful light and joyous music that have recurred in accounts of near-
death experiences, a great draw in nineteenth-century revival meetings. 
 
More prosaic, but of actual consequence for day-to-day military operations, were the 
accomplishments of Brigadier Generals Grenville Dodge in the western theater and 
George Sharpe in the east. These capable men demonstrated how operational and 
tactical intelligence could improve substantially as the North acquired the attributes of a 
national security state. Sharpe would, in fact, rise to become chief of the Union Bureau 
of Military Information, one of the most professional military intelligence organizations 
of the nineteenth century.22 Dodge, for his part, developed into both a capable military 
commander and a proficient intelligence officer, earning a reputation as a Jack-of-all-
trades. He was instrumental in forming the Union Army’s local group of spycatchers and 
in setting up the central intelligence organization General U.S. Grant urged upon the 
Union’s western-theater forces. Dodge organized and for a time commanded the First 
Tennessee Cavalry, consisting of Southern Unionists, all the more valuable for 
reconnaissance purposes and tactical intelligence collection since they knew Southern 
terrain and “spoke Dixie.” Dodge also established the First Alabama Colored Infantry 
and Cavalry Regiments, both of which assumed some intelligence collection 
responsibilities. Dodge assembled a large cadre of military scouts in the western theater 
and was particularly adept at utilizing female couriers, one of whom, Molly Malone, 
became associated with the Vicksburg Campaign through her intelligence collection 
activities. During the siege of the city, Dodge even placed a spy in Vicksburg who 
                                                          
20  Newman, Epics of Espionage, 39. 
21  Singer, Three Thousand Years of Espionage, 138-40. 
22  Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 569. 
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supplied crucial information about the city’s defenses and the condition of the besieged 
forces there. He pulled off a greater intelligence coup the following year when his 
operatives succeeded in penetrating the staff of the Confederate forces defending 
Atlanta, and subsequently was able to furnish General Sherman with the enemy order-
of-battle and disposition of forces. 
 
In the final year of the war, Sharpe and Dodge were reported to have had hundreds of 
intelligence operatives in what was left of the Confederacy. Both accomplished much 
with relatively few resources. Yet both men were reserved, apparently secure enough in 
their own right not to be boastful of their not insignificant intelligence exploits.23 
Neither endeavored to tell the entire story, much less to dramatize it. The only bluster in 
which Sharpe ever engaged was to point out occasionally that he had urged General 
George Meade to attack the spent Confederate army at Gettysburg and to cut off its path 
of retreat. He was probably offering good advice. Dodge and Sharpe used blacks 
regularly in intelligence operations, although data and details have been lost to 
posterity, and Sharpe proved astute at gleaning information from the Pamunkey Indians 
in Virginia as well. 
 
Dodge’s intelligence network eventually operated from middle Tennessee to Richmond 
and to the Gulf of Mexico. Although designed primarily to collect information on 
Confederate forces and troop dispositions, it was constantly on the lookout for rebel 
spies as well. Dodge recruited an old war horse of the army scouts, the intrepid L. A. 
Naron, who hailed from Alabama and spoke “deep Dixie,” but was unflinchingly loyal to 
the Union. Naron, more commonly known by his nickname “Captain Chickasaw,” 
hunted Confederate espionage agents and ran many of the counterintelligence 
operations in theater. A cunning military scout, “Captain Chickasaw” would habitually 
venture out ahead of the cavalry for a preliminary assessment of enemy strength. Such 
work was particularly dangerous and scouts were known to quip they would rather go 
into half-a-dozen battles than on one intelligence mission. “The secret service men were 
braver than the average soldier,” Dodge said, and he had a special talent for finding such 
men.24 His almost uncanny ability to recruit Southerners devoted to the Union cause for 
intelligence work bespoke his considerable understanding of human character. 
 
The Black Heritage 
 
Perhaps the most important, certainly the least appreciated, group of Union 
sympathizers and thus potential spies in the South was the black population. Many 
cases of anonymous blacks providing intelligence to Union forces, as the one who told 
General Grant where to land his troops below Vicksburg, are documented.25 A black 
man, John Scobell, through sheer determination, became one of Pinkerton’s most 
trusted agents. Tubman repeatedly turned to good account the skills and experience she 
gained in her Underground Railroad days, and provided critical information to Federal 
forces. Memories of the ante-bellum South, hardly fond ones, were a powerful 
motivating factor for her and others. Familiarity with the Southern states and Southern 
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ways equipped some blacks, probably including Tubman, to assist in counterintelligence 
operations also. A new Underground Railroad of sorts sprang up, by which black 
families passed along escapees from Southern prison camps until they reached Northern 
lines. Tubman’s contributions to the war effort have yet to be systematically analyzed, 
and the complete story might never be told. 
 
Later in the war, other black underground organizations, such as the Legal League, were 
formed, usually to act as couriers for Federal intelligence operatives.26 Runaway slaves 
were routinely interrogated once they entered federally controlled territory. Scobell had 
a large hand in such activities. He and his colleagues encouraged educated blacks to 
travel to Confederate areas to collect information and to serve as couriers. Black 
volunteers were often able to avail themselves of the protection and support accorded by 
relatives in the South, but such intelligence assets were not always utilized to the extent 
they might have been. Blacks were the unsung heroes of intelligence in the Civil War, 
and one can fairly assume that more intelligence collection was conducted by blacks 
than we will ever know about. In the atmosphere of late nineteenth-century America, 
the exploits of blacks were far less marketable than those of romantic white heroines, 
and many black accomplishments simply went unrecorded. In the “Jim Crow” South 
especially, blacks were closely associated with Republicanism, and adherents of the 
Confederate “lost cause” were given to downplaying the roles blacks assumed in the 
defeat. The name Nathan Bedford Forest immediately springs to mind as a case in point. 
 
A Time to Sow, A Time to Reap 
 
Soon after the war, Lafayette Baker completed the scrutinizing History of the Secret 
Service.27 Parts of this tome deal with intelligence collection, and some with 
rudimentary counterintelligence operations. But much of it discusses other matters 
entirely, such as drunkenness among army officers and the ease with which prostitutes 
gained entry to army camps. One is left to draw one’s own conclusions about the 
bearing, if any, such matters have upon intelligence. It is regrettable that few details 
about the recruitment, training, or handling of Union intelligence operatives are on 
offer. More has yet to be told.  
 
Agents were regularly recruited for intelligence work, though, and as the war dragged 
on, people frequently volunteered their services. At least on the Union side, sporadic 
efforts were made to establish and maintain a security network. Yet, despite such 
attempts as the cleverly staged arrest of Timothy Webster as a Confederate spy, or the 
counterintelligence “sting” operation using the Greenhow establishment as a 
“mousetrap,” the systematic counterintelligence and disinformation activities we would 
now take for granted in wartime were seldom orchestrated. Nor did self-initiated 
intelligence operations have much discernible effect on the war’s end result. We find few 
major engagements whose outcome was shaped by intelligence collection and analysis 
as, for instance, Anglo-American access to “Ultra” and the decrypted Japanese naval 
codes bore upon several World War II campaigns. Slack security, so striking in the case 
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of the Greenhow clan, was in truth a recurring theme on both sides, underscoring how 
disjointed and even droll a business counterintelligence operations could be in the 
1860s. Secrets were quite simply not well kept in the first place. Equally disconcerting 
from a professional standpoint, valuable intelligence was sometimes not acted upon, or 
revealed in such a manner as to provide no protection to sources, hence choking off the 
information flow. For example, a young railroad telegrapher, one J. O. Kerbey, who 
would later become a Union intelligence operative, ascertained before the First Battle of 
Manassas that some Confederate “masked batteries” were actually fakes built of logs, 
but Union commanders refused to believe him and ignored the telltale signs. Kerbey 
would later operate behind Confederate lines, eventually becoming a telegrapher in a 
Southern railway depot, where he would listen in on telegraphic communications in and 
out of Richmond. Kerbey also became affiliated with the Van Lew espionage ring. The 
larger point, though, is that Confederate “Quaker cannons,” harmless wooden objects 
designed to deceive those, like General McClellan, who were susceptible to deception 
operations even of the most primitive sort, are now proverbial.  
 
Another notable example of the mistrust of intelligence is to be found in General Lee’s 
brusque dismissal of information supplied by Confederate operatives in April 1863, less 
than three weeks prior to the Battle of Chancellorsville. According to the intelligence 
report, the Union Army of the Potomac disposed of nearly 150,000 effective troops with 
10, 000 reinforcements on the way, which was a fairly accurate estimate.28 Taking little 
notice, Lee divided his forces and assaulted a superior enemy, winning a brilliant 
victory. Although no broader significance of the event has been established by historical 
evidence, Lee did, in fact, reluctantly heed the counsel of another spy the following 
month after his army had invaded the North. Pure coincidence? Left “blind” in enemy 
territory when Stuart’s cavalry detached to conduct its own operations, the Army of 
Northern Virginia was spread out and in danger of being defeated in detail. The 
operative, who was employed by Lee’s chief lieutenant, General James Longstreet, 
warned Lee to concentrate his forces, lest they be demolished. The great battle at 
Gettysburg ensued. 
 
On yet another occasion, the hapless Union General Ambrose Burnside discovered that 
his orders were being printed verbatim in a Richmond newspaper. He had a British 
reporter arrested as a spy, and would have executed the man had higher authority not 
intervened. Circumstances surrounding the case remain mysterious. However 
Burnside’s orders got to Richmond, it is curious that they were printed in a newspaper, 
the quickest and surest method of compromising information. Union forces were tipped 
off about the leak almost immediately. It is possible that the newspaper itself, not a 
Confederate intelligence operation, was responsible for the revelation. 
 
Leaks to the press were incessant. General Lee’s famous compromised Order Number 
191, discovered in a field prior to the Battle of Antiedam in September 1862, which 
furnished crucial information about the disposition of the Army of Northern Virginia in 
western Maryland, found its way into a Philadelphia newspaper that very month. No one 
has even been able to explain exactly how.  
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The Sweeping Whirlwind’s Sway 
 
Reconstruction in the South provides a sober reminder that great military power cannot 
guarantee control of a defeated country. The ability to exploit the internal political 
situation within a targeted territory, not mere military might, is a crucial element of 
conquest.29 European states, for example, enjoyed greatest success when they were able 
to recruit local collaborators from within the society and exploit divisions among elites. 
Different configurations of social ties connecting conquerors with elites are central to 
both the patterns of conquest and the strategies conquerors employ.30 The lack of such 
ties made it difficult to overcome local opposition to reconstruction. Federal government 
intelligence about Southern society was woefully inadequate. 
 
Only in a narrow sense was it true that the Union had been preserved. True, the 
territorial integrity of the nation had been maintained, but this was practically all. In the 
four years of convulsion through which this end was attained, forces had been generated 
which rendered impossible a recurrence of ante-bellum conditions. The initial steps in 
the readjustment after the termination of hostilities were guided by the widespread 
northern belief that the old Union had been maintained; the final steps in 
reconstruction revealed with unmistakable clearness the truth of the southern view that 
a new Union had been established. 
 
The progress of the American nation in the decade succeeding the Civil War involved 
addressing  issues as complex as ever taxed the capacity of government. In the North, 
the dangerous encroachments of militarism on the domain of civil polity were to be 
terminated, and the tremendous financial burdens left by the war were to be diminished 
and readjusted so as to be bearable. In the border states, the passions and feuds of a 
divided society were to be curbed until time could bring tolerance and reunion. In the 
South, a wholly new social and political structure was to be built out of the wreckage of 
what conquest had destroyed, and the foundation had to be laid by some distinct 
determination of the rights and duties of the freedmen and by the construction of state 
governments. 
 
Along with these problems of internal policy, and somewhat in the background, lay 
certain questions of foreign relations, which were forced ominously to the forefront 
largely by shifting public opinion. Great Britain had won no high favor in either North or 
South by its policy during the war, and the French forces in Mexico were an 
incontrovertible expression of the malevolent disposition of  Napoleon III. With the fall 
of the Confederacy it became a seriously debated question in all the political circles of 
the North whether it would be well, before reducing the military establishment, to have 
a settlement of the grievances which the European powers had so recklessly heaped up 
against themselves. Only the imperative and absorbing demands of the home situation 
prevented major crises in foreign relations. 
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Ultimately, we must attribute strategic and operational intelligence shortfalls to a 
general lack of preparedness in America for large-scale conflict and political 
reconstruction, and to a decentralized political system with a diminutive executive 
branch of government. If President Davis himself could take the time to question a 
suspected low-level operative, then quite apparently little time and effort and few 
resources were being devoted to the administration of Confederate intelligence and 
counterintelligence operations. The Civil War was fought by hundreds of thousands of 
troops in America’s age of innocence. As often as not, it was conducted in an informal, 
haphazard manner. Fire, sword and war came suddenly to an America that understood 
too little of such things. Likewise, intelligence was also in its age of innocence. Had it 
been otherwise, the manner of war’s conduct and reconstruction thereafter would not 
have been so haphazard. Had it been otherwise, perhaps far fewer would have fought, 
suffered and died. If history offers any lesson, this is it.   
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